Ill-fated cross-country

Approach July 1981

By Richard A. Eldridge

APPROACH Contributing Writer

A CROSS-COUNTRY flight in the naval aviation community has always been looked upon by the aircrew involved as something of a "benny"—a little something extra. In the single-piloted aircraft, it involves the whole crew. Individuals or total crews, as the case may be, usually look forward to the change of pace offered by a cross-country flight. It could be as mundane as a 3-hr flight from Pt. A to Pt. B in the morning and back again the same day. Or it could entail a flight from one coast to the other, covering several days.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to cross-country flying. One advantage is that it gives an individual pilot or plane commander the chance to make decisions affecting such things as safety of flight, maintenance of the aircraft, and other factors not always covered in detail by NATOPS or SOP. In other words, it gives the responsible individual the chance to exercise mature judgment in arriving at well-thought-out decisions. On the other side of the ledger, however, it doesn’t always work out for the best. Sometimes wrong decisions are made, and aircraft accidents result.

The cross-country to be discussed falls into the latter category. It involved the four-man crew of an HH-2D helicopter with one passenger embarked. The preliminary planning and administrative paperwork was completed in accordance with squadron SOP, and the flight was authorized as an RO2N with the return on the third day.

The purpose of the flight was to obtain instrument training and airways navigational proficiency. The flight was planned from NAS Midcoast to NAS North with two en route stops. The flight would take 1 day. No flying was planned for the second day. On the third day, the crew was scheduled to return to NAS Midcoast.

The crew was very experienced and well qualified, consisting of the HAC (LCDR), copilot (LT, also a designated HAC), a pilot (LCDR) undergoing instructor training, and crewman (AW2). An airman was aboard as a passenger.

The squadron NATOPS and QA officers had flown the same helo the day before and had not reported any downing discrepancies. A minor nose oscillation discrepancy was noted, but it was not considered a downing gripe.

Shortly after takeoff on the first leg of the flight, the crew discovered that they had both a TACAN and a UHF discrepancy and returned to NAS Midcoast to have it fixed. Only the TACAN discrepancy was fixed. The helo was equipped only with one UHF radio. A second departure was made at 1351 for NAS Central. About an hour into the flight, the crewman reported a hydraulic leak on the decking behind the copilot’s seat. After landing at NAS Central, following a below minimums instrument approach, an attempt was made to get the hydraulic leak repaired. An AMH2 inspected the hydraulic leak and found hydraulic fluid all over the deck and in the scuppers. He tightened a B-nut and the helo was turned up to check the leak. The leak had not stopped, and the AMH2 recommended to the HAC that the helo be downed. Very limited maintenance facilities were available, however, as AIMD was secured for the weekend. Because of this, the HAC wanted to continue the flight, hoping to get the leak fixed at the next stop. His mind-set was more in favor of pressing on than getting the leak fixed. The HAC filed two separate flight plans to continue the flight but was thwarted each time, once due to weather and once to undesirable IFR routing which would not have allowed sufficient fuel to fly to an alternate. Frustrated and disappointed, the crew tied down the helo and spent the night at NAS Central.

A phone call was made to the parent squadron informing Operations of their decision to RON at NAS Central and discussing the hydraulic leak. The HAC told the squadron of his intention to fly to NAS Nearby, about 50 miles away, where more adequate maintenance facilities were available. Although the hydraulic leak was at first believed to be in the automatic stabilization equipment, it was eventually determined that the leak was coming from the landing gear return line. There are indications that the crew was unaware of this. The squadron concurred with the HAC’s decision to fly to NAS Nearby the next morning.

Despite poor weather and a still marginal UHF radio, the crew departed at 1139 the next morning and flew to NAS Nearby. To fix the leak, maintenance troubleshooters removed a section of the hydraulic line in order to manufacture a new section. The newly manufactured landing gear return line was tested and installed. NATOPS requires that a dropcheck be performed following the installation of a landing gear return line, but this was not accomplished. Squadron SOP required that a NATOPS manual and MIMs be in the aircraft on a cross-country flight, but neither was aboard.

A second telephone call was made to the squadron informing the SDO that the hydraulic leak was fixed and the crew was proceeding to its next stop—Able AFB.

Departure from NAS Nearby in IMC and less than desirable weather was made at 1610. The crew continued to experience difficulties with radio communications, but elected to press on. The HAC’s flight plan called for a fuel stop en route to Able AFB. Upon arrival at the planned fuel stop, they were diverted to another field because of an unscheduled operational readiness inspection which was going on. The crew landed at the divert fuel and was refueled. Takeoff for Able AFB on the fourth leg of this extended cross-country was made at 1847. They arrived at 2047. Except for experiencing extreme difficulty with their radio communications, the flight was uneventful. They were able to receive only on Guard but could transmit on the assigned frequency. After leaving instructions to repair the radio, the HAC and his crew spent the night at the AFB. Once again, the HAC called to inform the squadron that they were going to RON at Able AFB and proceed to their original destination the next morning. He did not notify the squadron of the continuing difficulty with the radio, nor was it repaired.

The following morning a flight plan was filed from Able AFB to NAS North. Departure was 0852. Weather at the time of takeoff was 800 feet overcast, with 2 miles visibility. Their destination weather was forecast to be 400 feet broken, 800 feet overcast, with 2 miles visibility in fog (not exactly a piece of cake with a malfunctioning radio). Weather at their alternate, Baker AFB, was forecast to be considerably better than the destination weather.

Immediately after takeoff from Able AFB, two-way radio communication was established, but with intermittent and garbled transmission. The crew was also experiencing a problem with their transponder. Approximately 30 minutes after takeoff, with no en route radio contact, the helo was observed by the controlling radar facility to be level at 5,000 feet in the vicinity of an en route VORTAC station. At that time, Center handed the helo off to Charley AFB Approach Control. The crew was being tracked at a groundspeed of 112 knots at the time of handoff. Immediately thereafter, the helo was observed to make a 24-degree course change to the left and slow to a groundspeed of 68 knots, still remaining at 5,000 feet. Within the next minute, the helo climbed to 5,100 feet and increased its groundspeed to 120 knots. The helo was next observed in a 30 degree course change to the left, concurrent with a 90 knot groundspeed, and a gradual descent. Within 1 ½ minutes of the first course change, the helo had turned 189 degrees from course to the left and descended to 4,600 feet at 1,000 feet per minute.

At 0932, Charley AFB Approach Control tried three times to contact the crew on Guard, with negative results. The helo had last been observed by the en route radar control center indicating an altitude of 4,600 feet. The contact was lost. Charley AFB Approach Control requested the crew squawk IDENT on its transponder. After the third request, the HAC responded to the IDENT request. The radar readout indicated 1,300 feet. Minimum en route altitude (MEA) for this segment of the route was 2,000 feet. At 0934, Charley AFB Approach Control broadcast to the helo that radar contact had been lost. At 0938, the crew was instructed to squawk code 7700 (the emergency identification code), but no response was noted. It was later determined that the helo crashed at about 0932, with fatal injuries to its five occupants.

Two-way radio communication was never established with Charley Approach Control. The crash site was approximately 2-3 miles from a civilian airport.

Many residents of the area were interviewed following the accident. Nearly all those interviewed reported hearing noises described as chugging, sputtering sounds, severe mis-fires, high-intensity, low-frequency noises, and other descriptions consistent with that of a helicopter struggling to stay airborne. One expert witness, a former Marine Corps helicopter test pilot who presently flies with the airlines, heard approximately four cycles of helicopter rotor blades flapping. Most witnesses and residents interviewed near the crash scene reported doors and windows which shook, houses that quivered and vibrated, and the noise of the impact and explosion.

Investigation of the scene of the crash revealed that the aircraft had impacted in a steep left bank and left yaw, with the main rotor blades making first contact with the ground. It slid a distance of 130 feet before coming to rest and being consumed by a fuel-fed fire.

A very thorough investigation of this accident was made. All parts of the aircraft which had not been consumed by the fire were recovered from the scene of the crash. The investigation revealed nothing other than impact to structural members and dynamic components, and no malfunctioning system components.

A second HH-2D was used to fly a similar profile to the area flown by the mishap aircraft. Radar transponder contact with the Center was maintained down as low as 550 feet AGL in both the normal and low sensitivities. Radio transmissions from this aircraft could also be heard at and below this altitude. Area residents reported that the sound of the profile helo was lower than the noise heard prior to the mishap, even though the profile helo was partially flown in an internal blade-out-of-track condition.

No reason could be found for the fact that the helo left its assigned altitude of 5,000 feet. Since the helo descended below the MEA of 2,000 feet, the opinion was that the crew was experiencing an actual or perceived malfunction of some sort. From the investigation, it was determined that the landing gear were down and the helicopter doors were open at the time of the crash, thereby indicating the crew had definite intentions to land as soon as possible. This is also supported by the fact that an aeronautical chart, IFR en route supplement, pilot’s circular computer and case, and a shaving kit were recovered at various points outside the periphery of the field at too great a distance and in too good condition to have been blown there by a postimpact explosion. The investigators opined that either the helicopter was vibrating significantly or that it was being piloted out of balanced flight, causing a forced wind rush through the cabin. This could account for the above items being found some distance from the crash site.

Three known contributing factors in this accident included poor weather, a malfunctioning radio, and extremely poor judgment on the part of the crew. In the final analysis of this crash, since nothing could be found to positively state what factor caused the accident, it went into the records as "undetermined."

In retrospect, there was ample opportunity and cause for the HAC to have aborted the flight upon several occasions. Viewed from the very beginning of the flight to its termination at the crash site, the whole scenario could be looked upon as a decision to press on at all costs. The recommendation by the AMH2 to down the aircraft was ignored. Aside from personal reasons, there was no compelling force to press on in view of the bad weather, other than the desires of the HAC and crew. The mere facts that the radio was almost incapable of functioning during the entire trip and that the flight was conducted in an improper manner for instrument flight in IMC should have caused an enroute cancellation.

One final comment concerns the qualifications of the HAC and copilot. They were used to making decisions, as both were former officers-in-charge of LAMPS detachments. With their combined experience and qualifications, they should have acknowledged the warning signs of the aircraft and the weather conditions instead of succumbing to "can-do-it is" and pressing on.