AW1 Thomas P. Feichtinger
VP-31  P-3B
BUNO: 152765
02/02/44-03/06/69
Birthplace: Nebraska
Hard landing at NAS Lemoore resulting in a fire.
Shipmates Comments:
AWC (Ret.) Ken E. Oyler:
I went to VP-2 in 1964. Tom, as I recall was there already, and though we were in different crews, he stood out as a very friendly and likeable guy. He was knowledgable as a 1st tech and always willing to help the younger shipmates. So many years has passed and things get a little cloudy, but I do remember those traits especially!
Media Accounts:
Navy Times, March 19, 1969:
LEMOORE, Calif.--Three officers and two enlisted men of Moffett Field's Patrol Squadron 31 were killed on March 6 in the crash of their P-3 Orion aircraft.
Another enlisted man, Aviation Machinist's Mate First Anthony Hutchison, was airlifted to the Army's Burn Center at Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Tex. where he died March 9.
Those killed were: Lt. Eugene L. Bates, an instructor; Lts (jg) Larry D. Ray and John E. Martin, both pilots in training; Aviation ASW Operator First Thomas P. Feichtinger and Aviation Electronics Technician First Michael E. Merz.

Approach, August, 1969:
The P-3B Accident
A Dive for the Deck

The P-3B was on a local instrument training flight as part of the RAG syllabus. The plane commander was accompanied by two pilots under instruction. The aircraft took off for a round-robin flight with practice instrument approaches to be conducted at various fields enroute. After two practice ILS approaches at another field, the aircraft was vectored to the GCA pattern at home field. With one of the pilots under instruction in the left seat, the P-3B made one GCA to a touch-and-go landing. The aircraft was then cleared for a second GCA to a touch-and-go landing. The GCA was normal until reaching PAR minimums of 100 ft AGL and 1/2 mile from the GCA touchdown point (750 ft past the approach end). At about this time, the controller informed the pilot: "Now you're going above glide path; slightly above glide path--you're going further above; you're above glide path; above glide path. Over landing threshold and over touchdown."

Shortly thereafter the aircraft contacted the runway in a very high rate of descent. A witness on the ground (a naval aviator in another aircraft who was holding short of the high-speed taxiway) observed the approach. He later described it in these terms:

"I first saw him when he was on glide slope, coming downhill...He looked a little high to me for the position he was in. I would guess he was high. I thought that it was about the time he should be leveling off for a low approach which is what I thought he was going to do; he seemed to be too high to make a landing near the end of the runway. He pushed the nose of the aircraft over and started coming downhill very fast; he had a high sink rate and it looked like he flared too late. He pulled the nose up but it didn't even slow the aircraft down--really coming downhill at that point. I knew he was in trouble but thought that it would be just a hard landing. He really pulled the nose up. It was a pretty abrupt flare, not the real smooth transition that I've seen that type of aircraft make before. The nose-down pitch was smoother than the flare to me. I've seen them do this before--just kind of dive for the deck, push the nose over in close and then flare but it looked like he was a little slow to be doing this and he was late in starting the flare because it didn't appear the flare did anything to break his rate of descent. He was really coming down!"

The aircraft struck the runway in a nose-high attitude, slightly left wing down at a sink rate computed to have been 18-20 fps. The impact point was 240 ft past the runway threshold. At touchdown, or shortly thereafter, the port wing separated from the fuselage inboard of the landing gear and a fire developed in the vicinity of the No. 2 fuel cell. The fuselage slid down the runway and came to rest off the left side of the runway, engulfed in flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

Precise Cause Undetermined
The precise cause of this accident could not be determined. Extensive investigation by the board failed to reveal any material failure or emergency situation, either real or imagined, which occurred prior to the accident which could have contributed to it.

It was the opinion of the board that the pilot (under instruction) who was still under simulated instrument conditions after reaching PAR minimums had leveled off; standard instructor procedure on an instrument approach calls for the pilot to remain on instruments until the copilot calls contact and informs the pilot of the direction of the runway. GCA procedures call for the pilot to initiate missed approach procedures at PAR minimums if the runway is not in sight. It is believed that the copilot (instructor) did not call contact and the pilot under instruction commenced level-off at the DH (Decision Height) and instead of executing a missed approach, crossed the runway threshold at an altitude estimated to be 60-80 ft. At this point, the pilot may have become confused as to whether he was supposed to initiate a missed approach or commence a landing. Once the decision to land was made it is probable that the pilot reduced power levers to FLIGHT IDLE and nosed the aircraft over at a dive angle estimated by eyewitnesses as from 12-35 degrees. At a point in the descent the aircraft was rotated to a nose-high attitude in an attempt to check the rate of descent. The nose-high attitude was attained prior to impact but was not effective in decreasing the sink rate of the aircraft. It was the opinion of the board that the pilot or copilot, or both, attempted to stop the sink rate with more attitude but did not add power.

The opinion advanced by the board as to the cause of this accident was discussed by the first endorser to the AAR. He stated in essence:

"The board concluded that the student pilot probably became confused as to whether he should wave off or land. This is certainly a possibility; however, the facts available are insufficient to accept this conclusion at the exclusion of other possibilities. The aircraft was observed to go above glide slop after passing GCA minimums but it is doubtful that power was applied at this time and a waveoff was most probably not intended. The tendency to go above glide path during the transition from instrument flying to contact flying at minimums is a typical reaction from an inexperienced student. With no additional power applied, the airspeed can be expected to decrease by 10 kts in a matter of seconds. The normal recovery from this situation is to lower the nose to increase airspeed, withholding any power reduction until the flare is well in hand. In the case of this accident, the rapid sink rate was not observed until after the nose dropped, indicating, as the board concluded, that the pushover was accompanied by a simultaneous power reduction, probably to FLIGHT IDLE. In the less than two seconds available between the pushover and impact the instructor (copilot) failed to apply power which was absolutely necessary to recover prior to impact. The failure of the instructor pilot to respond to the assumed abrupt power reduction with immediate power application might be attributed to complacency, inattention, preoccupation, a momentary distraction from either inside or outside the airplane--or it is possible to a landing flap situation instead of the approach flap situation and fully expected the flare to stop the high sink rate. The precise reason can never be known. The fact that the situation was allowed to develop to the point that a sudden power reduction could place the aircraft in extremis clearly illustrates the dilemma faced by all instructor pilots. At some point in the training of every student pilot it is essential to help him establish self-confidence in his ability to handle the aircraft. With some students this occurs naturally on the first few flights. With others, particularly those who have difficulty in some phase of the training, it takes longer. To establish self-confidence in a student it is essential that the instructor demostrate his own confidence in the student by not continually riding the controls. The point atwhich this can be done with any student requires the finest degree of judgement on the part of the instructor pilot and if that point is not reached, the student pilot must obviously receive more training or be dropped from the program."